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Our moral judgments about bioethical is-sues (as about many other issues) tend to be heavily affected by our intuitive and 
emotional responses. This is not surprising if we 
think of how often bioethical issues touch on our 
taboos and deeply held values. Consider the recent 
debate on so-called after-birth abortion, for exam-
ple. According to a prominent conservative thinker, 
“anyone should immediately be able to see that killing 
infants because they are unwanted is unacceptable” 
(emphasis added).1 The word “immediately” here 
suggests that it is our intuition, before any possible 
argument, that tells us that infanticide is impermissi-
ble. This is just one example of a common approach 
to (at least some) bioethical issues. Reliance on in-
tuitive and emotive responses is widespread across 
many other areas of bioethics. The current debate 
on biotechnological human enhancement is particu-
larly interesting in this respect. A strand of “biocon-
servatives” that has explicitly drawn connections to 
the modern conservative tradition, dating back to 
Edmund Burke,2 appeals to the alleged wisdom of 
our intuitions and emotions to ground opposition 
to some biotechnologies or their uses. Such reliance 
on intuitions and emotions is widely acknowledged 
as one of the distinguishing features of this conserva-
tive strand by both its supporters3 and opponents.4 
Granted, a number of antienhancement positions 
exist that clearly do not fall within the conservative 
tradition of social and political thought5—for exam-
ple, positions that raise objections based on egalitar-
ian arguments.6 What distinguishes the conservative 
strand examined here is, however, its focus on the 
methodology of bioethical discussion and particu-
larly on the weight that intuitions and emotions 
should play in such discussion. 
Two argumentative strategies have been adopted 
to philosophically defend the role of intuitions and 
emotions in bioethical debates. The first strategy 
is to claim that at least some intuitive and emotive 
responses—particularly about “playing God” with 
human nature—capture something beyond our 
reasoning capacity that nonetheless expresses some 
form of not fully articulable “wisdom,”7 such as 
particular insights about human dignity.8 Michael 
Sandel has suggested that our capacity to grasp the 
wrongness of playing God with genetics is limited 
by the too-narrow language of modern ethics, which 
is based only on the three notions of “autonomy, 
fairness, and individual rights.”9 Leon Kass offered 
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perhaps the most famous formulation 
of this intuitive and emotive biocon-
servative approach when he wrote 
that “[i]n crucial cases . . . repug-
nance is the emotional expression of 
deep wisdom, beyond reason’s power 
to fully articulate it . . . . To pollution 
and perversion, the fitting response 
can only be horror and revulsion; and 
conversely, generalized horror and 
revulsion are prima facie evidence of 
foulness and violation.”10
The second—and more concilia-
tory—strategy is to appeal to a form 
of what might be dubbed “compan-
ions-in-guilt arguments.”11 The idea 
here is that no moral approach is 
ultimately based solely on reasons, 
and therefore the explicit appeal to 
intuitions and emotions is no more 
flawed than arguments displaying 
logic and reasons.12 A neo-Humean 
version (one adapted from the phi-
losophy of David Hume) of this view 
holds that there is room for reasons 
and arguments in (bio)ethics, but 
only as long as they concern empiri-
cally verifiable facts and comparisons 
between relevantly similar cases or 
generalizations from cases, but not 
when discussing moral principles 
themselves.13 Moral evaluations are 
the result of the projection onto a 
state of affairs of human attitudes and 
concerns,14 which also affect our per-
ception of the wrongness of altering 
(human) nature through bioenhance-
ment.15
So-called bioliberals, those who in 
principle do not oppose human bio-
enhancement, tend to rely on rational 
arguments and to see intuitions and 
emotions mostly as sources of biases. 
This approach often translates into 
shifting the burden of proof onto bio-
conservatives and challenging them 
to provide arguments against the pro-
posed enhancement to back what bi-
oliberals perceive as merely intuitive, 
emotive, and irrational reactions.16
In this article, I am going to show 
that the methodological divide be-
tween bioliberals and bioconservatives 
is less significant than at first glance it 
appears to be and less significant than 
it is often taken to be. I will do so by 
defending two theses. The first is that 
reliance on intuitions and emotions is 
not a prerogative of bioconservatives: 
bioliberals have their typical intu-
itions and emotive responses and are 
for this reason exposed to potential 
biases in the same way as bioconser-
vatives are. The second thesis is that 
reliance on intuitions and emotions 
is not necessarily antithetic to reason 
and rationality. This latter thesis has 
been philosophically defended with 
particular reference to the debate on 
biotechnologies,17 while the former is 
perhaps more controversial and more 
difficult to accept—at least for biolib-
erals. In both cases, I will support the 
claims by drawing on resources from 
the field of moral psychology and the 
sciences of the mind and, particularly, 
by applying to some positions in the 
enhancement debate recent findings 
about the role of intuitions and emo-
tions in human moral assessment. 
This new empirically informed per-
spective holds promises for solving 
the methodological controversy be-
tween bioconservatives and bioliber-
als. My aim is not, of course, to find a 
common ground on substantial ethi-
cal issues concerning the permissibil-
ity of cloning or of enhancement.18  
Nor is my aim that of going beyond a 
polarization on substantial issues be-
tween liberals and conservatives that 
after all characterizes many forms of 
disagreements (religious, political, 
moral). However, it is essential to 
find some common methodological 
premise starting from which a proper 
dialogue and a proper debate might 
take place. Sharing a methodology 
for ethical discussion is important 
because, as I will show, dismissing 
bioethical positions merely on the ba-
sis of their methodological assump-
tions—as participants in the debate 
on biotechnology often do—can 
lead authors to overlook important 
insights coming from the opposite 
field.
The view that intuitions, emo-
tions, and rationality are not 
mutually exclusive but actually in-
terdependent has a long philosophi-
cal tradition. It dates back at least to 
Aristotle’s conception of the virtuous 
man as someone capable of intuitive 
insights, up to contemporary debates 
about the (alleged) wisdom of ex-
perts’ intuitions19 and neo-Humean 
interpretations of moral reasoning 
in the debate on biotechnologies.20 
The same view is supported by recent 
findings and theories in neurobiol-
ogy and moral psychology and subse-
quent developments in metaethics.21 
Consider, for example, findings and 
theories about the essential role of 
emotions for the correct functioning 
of our practical rationality22 and of 
intuitions in our moral and practi-
cal decision-making.23 These theories 
have informed critical analysis that is 
relevant to many areas of applied phi-
losophy—from risk-assessment24 to 
interpretation of political divisions.25 
Quite surprisingly, in spite of the 
controversy regarding the (alleged) 
wisdom of intuitions and emotions in 
bioethics, the debate about enhance-
ment biotechnologies has remained 
untouched by the potential insights 
that this kind of psychological reflec-
tion might bring. This paper aims to 
fill this gap in the literature.
A note on terminology is necessary. 
Following a common trend in moral 
psychology,26 metaethics,27 and ap-
plied ethics28 alike, I will consider, for 
the present purposes, “emotions” and 
“intuitions” as two relevantly simi-
lar types of mental phenomena and 
use the terms (almost) interchange-
ably. Both intuitions and emotions 
happen automatically and without 
awareness, and both can have cogni-
tive contents and be motivational at 
the same time. According to Sabine 
Roeser, for example, “[E]thical intu-
itions are paradigmatically cognitive 
moral emotions,”29 and according to 
Jonathan Dancy, “[R]ecent intuition-
ism can allow itself a richer concep-
tion of intuition, one that allows us to 
think of an intuition as intrinsically 
motivational, and so not ‘purely’ cog-
nitive.”30 Jonathan Haidt proposes 
that “cognitive elements of emo-
tions—such as appraisals of events 
and alterations of attention and vigi-
lance—are subtypes of intuitions” 
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT      3
that “happen automatically and with 
conscious awareness of the outputs, 
but not of the process.”31 Ultimately, 
this literature seems to concur with 
Dancy on the claim that “the stan-
dard contrast between intuition and 
emotion is a mistake.”32  
Intuitions, Emotions, and 
Biases in (Bio)ethics
Judgments, including ethical ones, that are not based on rational scru-
tiny but instead grounded in emo-
tions and intuitions are often subject 
to biases.33 I use “bias” in a very gen-
eral sense to include all the distorting 
psychological (including emotional) 
mechanisms that systematically affect 
the rationality of a certain (moral or 
nonmoral) judgment. For instance, 
an “affect heuristics”34—a tendency 
to make quick judgments based on 
feelings rather than calculation—
may bias risk assessment. Fear, for 
example, leads people to amplify risk 
estimates: the more dreadful a certain 
outcome is, the more probable it is 
perceived to be, and the same holds 
for a range of negative emotions.35 
“Probability neglect” is another in-
teresting psychological phenomenon 
whereby, when assessing a certain 
risk, people become the less sensitive 
to information about the actual prob-
abilities of a certain outcome, the 
worse the feeling experienced about 
that outcome.36 Risk assessment is 
not a type of moral judgment, but 
it can affect moral judgments if, and 
to the extent that, moral judgments 
need to take consequences and prob-
abilities into account.
Other kinds of distorting factors 
affect more directly moral intuitions, 
in other words, moral beliefs that are 
held “independent of any process 
of inferring them from any other 
belief.”37 One such factor is the so-
called framing effect, the tendency 
to assess a certain scenario depending 
on how it is described rather than on 
what it actually contains. For exam-
ple, our intuitions about the moral 
permissibility of the different options 
in the well-known imagined trolley 
case are heavily affected by the way 
the options are described. A study has 
shown that people tend to consider 
the very same option—for instance, 
diverting the trolley to a side track so 
that one person instead of five will be 
killed—more permissible if it is de-
scribed in terms of the persons who 
would be saved rather than in terms 
of the persons who would be killed.38 
It is interesting to note, how-
ever, that, despite such unreliabil-
ity, many thought experiments and 
theoretical frameworks that are used 
to ground substantial bioethical po-
sitions are based on moral intuitions 
or emotions. The trolley case, first 
introduced to discuss the morality 
of abortion,39 is just one example. In 
what is known as the “non-identity 
problem,” Derek Parfit focused on 
the intuition that it is impermissible 
to conceive a child with a certain 
(mild) disease when a normal child 
could be easily conceived instead (for 
instance by postponing the intended 
pregnancy by a few months).40 The 
non-identity problem is a “problem” 
precisely because it is hard to justify 
rationally the intuition if we consider 
that the alternative for the potential 
mildly handicapped child would be 
nonexistence. The intuition in the 
non-identity problem is currently up-
held to support “bioliberal” positions 
in the enhancement debate, such as 
the idea that we could or even should 
select the “best” embryo in the case of 
in vitro fertilization although failing 
to do so would not harm anyone.41 
One might wonder whether reliance 
on intuitions in such cases is any dif-
ferent, with regard to the risk of bi-
ases, from reliance on intuitions by 
bioconservatives. 
Recent studies and findings in 
moral psychology suggest that in the 
vast majority of cases, our moral judg-
ments are the expression of intuitions 
or emotions, rather than of reason 
alone.42 According to the social intu-
itionist model proposed by Jonathan 
Haidt, reasoning and principles are, 
at best, post hoc rationalizations of 
our intuitive and emotive evalua-
tions. This is illustrated by the many 
cases of “moral dumbfounding,” 
when people unsuccessfully try to 
provide reasons that they think a cer-
tain practice—for instance, secret in-
cest between consenting adults, with 
contraception used—is wrong, but 
still are not willing to give up their 
conviction after they are shown that 
what they say cannot do the explana-
tory work. For instance, one reason 
often provided in discussion about 
this kind of incest is that it would en-
tail the risk of genetic abnormalities 
in the offspring, but subjects would 
not change their negative evaluation 
of incest even if it were pointed out 
that different contraceptives would 
be used; rather, they would come up 
with some alternative reason to ex-
plain their evaluation, but, again, this 
reason could be easily dismissed with-
out any effect on their moral stance, 
and so on. This suggests that such a 
stance is grounded in a strong intu-
ition rather than in reasons and, more 
importantly, that because of this in-
tuitive or emotive nature, the stance 
is likely to be irrational or biased.43 
Often these psychological find-
ings have focused on the difference 
between the moral psychology of self-
reported liberals and of self-reported 
conservatives. Interestingly, evidence 
suggests that reliance on intuitions 
and emotions is not a prerogative of 
the “conservative mind”; rather, the 
difference between liberals and con-
servatives is that they rely on differ-
ent sets of intuitions.44 And the same 
seems to be true if, instead of intu-
itions, we consider the emotional as-
pects of the conservative and liberal 
approaches. Evidence suggests, for ex-
ample, that the autonomy-based mo-
rality that defines the liberal approach 
is characterized by a specific emo-
tion, namely anger, that is generally 
aroused when autonomy violations 
occur, as opposed to emotions such 
as contempt or disgust that character-
ize the conservative approach.45 Also 
in this case, the difference between 
liberals and conservatives is based on 
two different sets of emotions, rather 
than on the different use they make 
of arguments and reasoning.
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Intuitions, Emotions, and 
Biases in Bioconservatives
Many philosophers are skepti-cal about the role of intuitions 
and emotions in ethics. Skepticism is 
particularly pronounced in bioethics 
because scientific progress constantly 
proposes new possible scenarios that 
are very different from the ones that 
have shaped the evolutionary devel-
opment of intuitions and emotions 
in the human mind.46 For instance, 
some bioliberals claim that opposi-
tion to human enhancement that is 
based on intuitions or emotions is 
easily subject to status quo bias and 
that it is subject to this type of bias 
precisely because it is based on intu-
itions and emotions rather than rea-
son.47 Status quo bias is defined as an 
“inappropriate (irrational) preference 
for an option because it preserves the 
status quo” (p. 658). The key words 
here are “irrational” and “inappropri-
ate.” What makes a preference irra-
tional and inappropriate? If we want 
to claim that a piece of reasoning is 
biased and irrational, we presumably 
need a standard of rationality to ap-
peal to. The “Reversal Test” devised 
by Nick Bostrom and Toby Ord is a 
proposed standard. According to this, 
if an opponent of a certain form of 
enhancement (increasing the level 
of serotonin in our brain to improve 
impulse control, for instance48) is 
not willing to claim that a certain 
parameter in the human physiology 
should be modified in the opposite 
direction (decreasing the level of se-
rotonin), and if the opponent cannot 
demonstrate that the current level of 
that parameter is optimal either, then, 
other things being equal (for exam-
ple, there is no significant transition 
cost involved), the opposition to that 
enhancement intervention is biased. 
Concerns about interfering with the 
course of evolution, which are often 
put forward by bioconservatives,49 
might be seen as an example of status 
quo bias.
The distorting influence of emo-
tions on risk assessment50 provides 
a further reason for thinking that 
bioconservatives might be biased in 
their assessment of the possible con-
sequences of the use of some biotech-
nologies. The mere possibility that 
some new biotechnologies such as 
genetic engineering or cloning would 
bring about scary scenarios like the 
ones depicted in fictional works such 
as Gattaca or Brave New World could 
make these scenarios look more prob-
able than they actually are. There 
is evidence showing such mecha-
nisms at work in perception of risk 
and acceptance of nuclear power.51 
Prospects fueled by sci-fi novelists or 
the Hollywood industry might affect 
judgments on the permissibility of 
biotechnologies in the same way. It 
is noteworthy that some of the most 
strenuous opponents of enhance-
ment biotechnologies often remind 
people of scary fictional scenarios or 
other things that cast a shadow over 
our “posthuman future” in order to 
support their positions.52 This might 
be a strategy to instill a sentiment 
of fear in others, but might also be 
a symptom of bioconservatives’ own 
fears, which might distort their prob-
abilistic assessment of the possible 
consequences of adopting certain 
biotechnologies.
Intuitions, Emotions, and 
Biases in Bioliberals
Whether Haidt’s (and col-leagues’) theory about the in-
tuitive and emotive foundations of 
the liberal mind is true is debatable 
on empirical grounds, and not all 
the evidence available supports the 
social intuitionist model.53 What is 
true is that bioliberals do base some 
of their arguments on unanalyzed in-
tuitions, in spite of their defense of 
rationality in ethics. For example, it 
is only by accepting the intuitive re-
sponse to the non-identity problem 
that John Harris and Julian Savulescu 
can endorse the principle of procre-
ative beneficence: since no harm 
would be done to the future person 
if a “normal” or even a defective em-
bryo were implanted instead of the 
“best embryo,” it is hard to argue that 
there is a moral obligation to select 
the best embryo in order to give the 
best start in life to your child. Parfit 
admitted his frustration at not being 
able to provide the “Theory X” that 
justifies this kind of intuition; Harris 
and Savulescu just seem to take the 
intuition as a solid basis for their ar-
guments. As Rebecca Bennett puts 
it,  “Unlike [with] Parfit, Harris and 
Savulescu’s examples are used to show 
that because we feel that a choice is 
wrong it therefore must be actually 
wrong to make these choices” (em-
phasis added).54
Or take again the Reversal Test, 
which arguably is a perfect example 
of bioliberals’ “rational” approach. 
The test might offer a useful concep-
tual tool to certify the rationality of 
procreative beneficence. Bioliberals 
might argue that if you think that 
selecting the best embryo is not per-
missible, then the burden of proof is 
on you to demonstrate that either (1) 
the opposite solution would be better 
(choosing the “worst” embryo) or (2) 
the current state is optimal (the natu-
ral lottery is optimal); if you can’t do 
that, then your position is affected by 
a status quo bias. No bioconservative 
would uphold 1, and probably very 
few would bite the bullet by buying 
2. However, this heuristics sets some 
rules of the game that might them-
selves be questioned. For example, 
enhancement implemented in the 
form of a “liberal eugenics” policy 
might actively promote inequalities 
in any given society between those 
who can and those who cannot (and 
maybe in some cases do not want 
to) undergo enhancement interven-
tions;55 in other words, egalitarian 
goals might not be adequately pro-
moted in a society where enhance-
ments are liberally pursued,56 even if 
within a liberal framework enhancing 
were the most rational option accord-
ing to the reversal test. So, in virtue 
of the questionability of these rules, 
an opponent of enhancement might 
consistently claim that neither 1 nor 
2 is true, but that from this negation 
it does not follow that procreative 
beneficence is a valid principle. In 
other words, one might argue that 
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the reversal test is an expression of a 
“neoliberal orthodoxy”57 of individu-
alistic choice in free markets, which 
is simply assumed but not critically 
assessed, for example, in light of the 
aforementioned egalitarian objec-
tions. 
At this point, one might argue that 
it simply is not true that bioliberals 
rely on an uncritical and intuitive 
endorsement of liberty in spite of the 
potential costs in terms of equality. In 
fact, the bioliberal approach is often 
presented by its defenders as the re-
sult of a reasonable balance between 
liberal and egalitarian requirements. 
There are, however, reasons to be 
suspicious, if we analyze the differ-
ent claims bioliberals have put for-
ward to defend their views against 
equality-based objections. There are 
at least four such claims. The first is 
empirical in nature: some bioliberals 
have pointed out that bioenhance-
ments would become progressively, 
and relatively rapidly, accessible to 
almost everyone, as has been the case 
with many other new technologies.58 
The second claim is that bioenhance-
ment could actually promote equal-
ity by correcting the unfairness of 
the genetic lottery, for instance, if we 
prioritized enhancements of those 
with a low level of functioning of 
any capacity.59 The third claim is that 
equality matters, but not so much as 
to outweigh the importance of lib-
erty to make procreative choices.60 
Finally, some have pointed out that 
we already accept, and indeed pro-
mote, inequalities through other, 
more traditional means (for instance, 
by allowing those who can afford to 
send their children to private schools 
to do so), and there is no reason for 
thinking that the same inequalities 
brought about through new forms of 
human enhancement should be con-
sidered morally different.61
Analyzing each of these claims 
would be well beyond the scope of this 
paper. What I want to point out here 
is that a liberal defense of enhance-
ment cannot consistently embrace all 
of them to respond to equality-based 
objections, because some of these ar-
gumentative strategies are mutually 
exclusive. For instance, either it is rea-
sonable to predict, based on empirical 
evidence about the diffusion of other 
technologies, that enhancement will 
result in inequalities, or it is not. If 
it is not, then no further argument is 
required to address the objection. If it 
is, then either the value of liberty and 
of the expected utility that enhance-
ment might bring about outweighs 
equality costs (at least when these 
costs are not too high), or it does 
not. If it does, then, again, no fur-
ther argument is required. If it does 
not, then bioliberals are required to 
provide other arguments, for example 
the argument that enhancement ac-
tually promotes equality. The point is 
that in the presence of different possi-
ble and mutually exclusive strategies, 
when one would be sufficient, it is 
hard to see how any of these strategies 
can do any actual justificatory work 
in defending enhancement from 
equality-based objections. These dif-
ferent possible responses look very 
much like post-hoc rationalizations 
of the intuition that liberty should be 
the guiding principle when it comes 
to human enhancement, no matter 
what the possible costs in terms of 
equality. But if this last claim is defen-
sible, then reasons must be provided 
to support the point (and perhaps the 
intuition) that liberty matters more 
than equality when the two principles 
conflict with one another. 
“Reasoned Intuitions”?
One important source of criticism of the intuitive and emotive ac-
count of moral judgments stems from 
the view that emotions, intuitions, 
and rationality cannot be separated 
in the way Haidt and other moral 
psychologists presuppose. Rather, as 
has been claimed, ethical intuitions 
and emotions “can be the source and 
the result of ethical reflection and de-
liberation.”62 It is interesting to note 
how Haidt and Roeser use neurobi-
ologist Antonio Damasio’s studies on 
how our practical rationality requires 
the correct functioning of emotions63 
to further their own, opposite causes. 
Haidt uses Damasio’s observations as 
evidence in support of his thesis that 
our morality is based on emotions 
rather than on rationality,64 whereas 
Roeser uses the same evidence to 
support the thesis that our morality 
is based on emotion and therefore on 
rationality.65 This suggests, at the very 
least, that the notion of “rationality” 
is in need of clarification, particularly 
with regard to its relation to emotions 
and intuitions.
What I want to focus on here is 
the evidence that suggests that intui-
tive and immediate responses in gen-
eral can be the result of automatized 
processes based on explicit and con-
sciously held reasons, thus expressing 
a form of rationality. This would im-
ply that although most of our moral 
judgments might be intuitive or 
emotional, this is not the whole story, 
and some intuitive and emotional re-
sponses might deserve more attention 
and scrutiny than currently granted. 
Let’s see more in details.
Two sets of empirical data are 
particularly interesting for the pres-
ent discussion: First, high-priority 
and consciously held goals can pre-
vail over temptations, stereotypes, 
and immediate reactions through a 
“behavioral inhibition system” once 
people have been made aware of hav-
ing acted contrary to these goals and 
experience a self-directed negative 
feeling (in particular, experiments 
have focused on racial stereotypes 
that conflict with consciously held 
egalitarian goals).66 Second, the way 
high-priority (moral) goals can pre-
vail can itself be an emotional or in-
tuitive response,67 which is consistent 
with empirical findings about the au-
tomatization of high-priority (moral 
and nonmoral) goals.68
From empirical studies on resis-
tance to temptations, for example, 
Fishbach and colleagues have con-
cluded that “with continuing at-
tempts at self-control individuals may 
develop facilitative links between rep-
resentations of momentarily activated 
temptations and the corresponding 
high-priority goals with which they 
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may interfere. Because of the general 
pervasiveness of self-control striv-
ings, such facilitative links may be 
overlearned to the point of their a) 
subliminal activation, and b) relative 
independence of cognitive resourc-
es.”69 This means that people’s au-
tomatic, immediate reactions might 
be due to higher-priority moral goals 
that are not directly recalled, but that 
have been overlearned so that their 
application does not require any con-
scious resource.
These results were replicated 
across a wide variety of (moral and 
nonmoral) goals,70 also outside the 
domain of temptations. John Bargh 
and colleagues, for instance, have 
detected such mechanisms at work 
when the goal activated is to perform 
well at tasks or to cooperate with 
others. These results have been in-
terpreted as suggesting that “mental 
representations of goals can become 
activated without an act of conscious 
will, such that subsequent behavior 
is then guided by these goals within 
the situational context faced by the 
individual.”71 In other words, “over 
time the goal representation will de-
velop an automatic association with 
the features of those situations in 
which that goal has been repeatedly 
and consistently chosen and pursued 
in the past” (p. 1015) so that eventu-
ally environmental cues, rather than 
conscious choice, activate the (moral) 
goal. 
The more general principle of psy-
chology here at work is that, when 
the same goal is repeatedly activated 
in the same kind of situations, ef-
fortful conscious reflection tends to 
drop out, as no longer necessary to 
apply that goal, with the consequent 
judgments becoming automatized 
responses.72 More importantly for 
the present discussion, “on the basis 
of the assumption that goals become 
automated through their repeated 
selection in a given situation, such 
automatic goals should generally be 
in line with the individual’s valued, 
aspired-to life goals and purposes.”73 
Actually, this evidence seems to pro-
vide empirical confirmation for the 
intuitionist claim that “intuitions 
are a product of our rational faculty,” 
which “might be the result of a long 
process of reflection.”74
Let us now turn again to the en-
hancement debate to try to apply 
these insights. The fact that someone 
feels “repugnance” at the thought of 
human cloning or intuits the exis-
tence of a “Factor X” that accounts 
for human dignity75 means only that 
the individual’s judgments on the 
impermissibility of using certain bio-
technologies are not inferred from any 
principle. It does not mean, however, 
that the judgments cannot be justified 
by any principle (or “higher-priority 
moral goal”) or that they are not ex-
plained by an independent reflection 
on moral goals that the individual has 
previously made, for example, due 
to his or her education or upbring-
ing (for instance a reflection on the 
threat to egalitarian goals posed by a 
“neoliberal orthodoxy”). In the same 
way, an intuition that it is wrong to 
alter the course of evolution or God’s 
plan is an immediate response that 
can arise on the background view 
that “playing God” is, for some rea-
son, wrong, a view on which there is 
a philosophical debate where reasons 
can be given and assessed. And this 
is a view that, exactly like a “liberal 
orthodoxy” or an egalitarian objec-
tion, can be articulated and is subject 
to rational scrutiny.
Rationality, Wisdom, and the 
Arena for the Enhancement 
Debate
The lack of clarity surrounding the concept of “rationality” rec-
ommends caution when bestowing 
certificates of rationality to oneself, 
or of lack thereof to one’s opponents, 
as bioliberals tend to do. The same is 
true when the concept invoked is that 
of “wisdom,” which is more common 
among conservatives. Clearly defin-
ing “wisdom” is problematic because, 
as has been pointed out, “[t]here are 
as many definitions of wisdom as 
authors who attempt to understand 
what wisdom is.”76 Philosophical ac-
counts of “wisdom” are often ground-
ed in epistemic humility (the sense 
in which, for instance, Socrates was 
wise) or accuracy. Alternatively, they 
are based on knowledge about how 
to live well and on appreciation of 
the value of living well (in the sense 
of Aristotelian practical wisdom).77 
Sometimes accounts are hybrid ver-
sions, including aspects of these dif-
ferent definitions.78 None of these 
definitions seem, however, to cap-
ture the meaning that Kass and other 
conservatives attach to the notion 
of wisdom. Their “wisdom” could 
rather be intended as a capacity for 
moral insights that make up for the 
limitations of our moral reasoning. 
As Levin writes, “[T]hese sentiments 
and insights are reasonable but not 
fully rational. They are wise but not 
fully explicit.”79 In this view, intu-
itions and emotions are a source of 
wisdom, but wisdom is not the same 
as rationality. Nor is it something less 
or more than rationality. Simply, it is 
taken to be something different, but 
more powerful than rationality in 
providing moral insights. Why this 
should be the case is, however, unclear, 
considering that the best (in other 
words, empirically informed) expla-
nation for why some intuitions and 
emotions can convey moral insights 
is that they are the result of automa-
tized moral reflection. Rationality is 
not something easily separable from 
intuitions and emotions, but there is 
no need to postulate a separate fac-
ulty or virtue, such as “wisdom,” to 
account for the fact that there might 
be deep insights speaking through 
our emotions or intuitions: reflection 
and reasons can and should be used 
to justify such insights. 
To be sure, this analysis raises the 
complex philosophical problem of 
the foundation of morality, some-
thing whose discussion (let alone 
solution) is well beyond the scope of 
this paper. One might argue, in other 
words, that even this “second-order” 
rational defense would be grounded 
in some other intuition or emotion, 
thus triggering an infinite regress. 
Here I want just to point out that, 
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even if infinite regress justified an in-
tuitionist or a sentimentalist metaeth-
ics, we would still gain something in 
terms of reflective capacity and dia-
logue if we tried to dig a bit deeper 
than the first level of intuitive and 
emotive responses and to accept the 
idea that intuitions and emotions can 
express reasons, and sometimes good 
ones. My analysis aims at encourag-
ing those who take part in bioethi-
cal discussion to work in both these 
directions, rather than dismiss oppo-
nent positions just because they are 
articulated through the (allegedly) 
narrow language of “autonomy, fair-
ness and individual rights”80 or be-
cause they are the product of intuitive 
or emotive reactions.81 As Kaebnick 
has put it, even if “[w]e will not be 
able to support our positions with ar-
guments that are entirely noncircular, 
. . . we should still be able to articu-
late, convey, and defend our views.”82 
After all, even logic has fundamental 
principles that cannot be defended in 
terms of something other (or more 
fundamental) than logic itself, but 
this fact provides no reason to dismiss 
logic or to see logic as something pre-
carious.
In light of the analysis conducted 
here, two things are required of par-
ticipants in the enhancement debate. 
The first is the capacity to recognize 
the intuitions that ground one’s mor-
al stances, a task in which bioconser-
vatives are certainly performing much 
better than bioliberals. The second is 
a convincing demonstration—a ra-
tional argument to the effect that—
the more general goals that these 
intuitions and emotions express are 
justifiable through arguments and 
reason-giving. If this justification 
through articulable reasons can be 
provided, then it would make sense 
to say that the intuitions or emotions 
through which they express them-
selves are a source of wisdom or, to 
use an equivalent word, of rationality.
The aim of this paper is to en-
courage both parties engaged in the 
enhancement debate to abandon 
what often looks like a methodologi-
cal dogmatism (either against or in 
favor of intuitions and emotions). 
However, it is bioliberals, in other 
words, those more fiercely opposed 
to intuitions and emotions in ethi-
cal discussion, who have the most 
compelling reasons for overcoming 
their tendency to dismiss opponents’ 
methodological approach. In fact, my 
analysis suggests that often their op-
ponents’ methodological approach—
reliance on intuitive and emotive 
stances—is also their own method-
ological approach. 
Furthermore, bioliberals are called 
on to make a bigger effort than bio-
conservatives to overcome their 
skepticism toward their opponents’ 
methodological approach. One im-
portant aspect of bioethical discus-
sion that is often overlooked is that 
bioconservatives are frequently keen 
to provide reasons and arguments in 
support of their intuitions.83 Even 
Kass, after having claimed that re-
pugnance might be the last voice that 
speaks up in defense of our humanity, 
outlines some more general concerns 
about cloning and the wide use of 
biotechnologies in human reproduc-
tion that go beyond mere reliance 
on gut feelings, for instance, slippery 
slope arguments or concerns about 
confounding the moral relations and 
roles in a family.84 These concerns can 
be articulated and then assessed based 
on reason-giving, arguments, and re-
flection. 
Bioconservatives should, however, 
be more open and explicit about this 
latter aspect of their argumentative 
strategy. There is no need to push—
as they often do—the problematic 
thesis that intuitions and emotions 
are better than explicit arguments to 
put up a convincing case against en-
hancement. Consider the following 
example. Robert Sparrow has argued 
that moral bioenhancement threatens 
egalitarian goals because it foreshad-
ows a division of classes where the 
morally enhanced, as in Plato’s ideal 
republic (or perhaps as in Gattaca), 
would have a stronger claim to gov-
ern over, and therefore dominate, the 
morally “normal.”85 Now, it is not 
obvious that this would be a mor-
ally impermissible outcome. Perhaps 
a platonic type of republic would be 
better than a democracy, all things 
considered. But this kind of issue 
demonstrates the importance of mak-
ing reasons and underlying concerns 
explicit so that the ultimate moral 
or philosophical issues at stake—in 
this case, the right balance between 
egalitarian and liberal values—can 
be detected, unpacked, and ratio-
nally discussed, instead of remaining 
hidden and unexamined in intuitive 
and emotive responses that might or 
might not be wise.
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